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Farmers’ Cooperatives in China:
A Typology of Fraud and Failure
Zhanping Hu, Qian Forrest Zhang, and John A. Donaldson*
A B S T R A C T
Since the 1990s, agricultural cooperatives—particularly what China calls Farmers’ Special-
ized Cooperatives—have experienced rapid expansion in China. After more than two de-
cades of growth and policy support, what is the overall performance of the ever-increasing
numbers of these cooperatives? We visited 50 cooperatives across the country, most of
which had ofﬁcially been lauded as successful, to make a ﬁrst-hand evaluation of their over-
all status and performance. We argue that, judging by either international or Chinese stan-
dards, the vast majority of these agricultural cooperatives are not authentic and fail to deliver
expected beneﬁts to smallholders. We categorize them into ﬁve types: genuine cooperatives,
shell cooperatives, de facto private agribusinesses, decooperativized cooperatives, and failed
cooperatives. Four barriers impede the long-term prospects of authentic cooperatives: social
differentiation, lack of trust, unpredictable markets, and poor policy design and implemen-
tation.
The Xiajia farmers’ specialized cooperative1—one of China’s ﬁrst—has beenlauded as an unusually successful national model. Honored by China’s Min-
istry of Agriculture in 2003 as a “National Excellent Farmers’ Cooperative,” the
leader of this northeastern cooperative, Zhang Shuxiang, toured China to share
the secrets of the cooperative’s success and to inspire other aspiring cooperative
leaders.2 The myriad national and international honorary titles bestowed on
Zhang lauded her selﬂess contribution to both the Xiajia cooperative and China’s
rural cooperatives in general. A continuous stream of visitors—university profes-
* This research was supported by a grant from the Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research
Fund Tier 2 (Fund #MOE2012-T2-2-115).
1. Before the 2006 Cooperatives Law was issued, Chinese cooperatives were referred to by a variety of
terms, such as farmer cooperatives or agricultural cooperatives. The law explicitly dictated that farmers’ co-
operatives should be both specialized and economically oriented. For the sake of convenience, this article
uses the term “cooperative” to refer to “farmers’ specialized cooperative” (农民专业合作社) unless otherwise
noted.
2. Xiajia and Zhang Shuxiang are real names, as the basic information contained here is publicly accessi-
ble. Unless otherwise noted, this article refers to other people and agribusinesses by pseudonyms to protect
the identities of interviewees.
Correction: This article was corrected and reposted on May 25, 2017, to add funding information.
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sors and students, journalists and ofﬁcials—visited her village to better under-
stand the cooperative’s success. Even as late as November 2014, Xiajia remained
on the list of national demonstration cooperatives compiled by nine ministries of
China’s State Council and was featured in a number of national newspaper arti-
cles.3 Yet when we visited Xiajia in August 2015 we were greeted by an aban-
doned ofﬁce, with neither founder nor staff anywhere in sight. We were not
the only ones seeking Ms. Zhang—the cooperative’s ofﬁce door was papered with
court summonses impugning the character of Xiajia’s charismatic leader. Inter-
views with neighbors and former members revealed that Zhang, unable to repay
money borrowed from villagers, had disappeared without a trace nearly six
months earlier.
The closure in Xiajia was not an unusual failure among China’s cooperatives.
Indeed, all but two of the 50 so-called cooperatives that we visited in all regions of
China either were failing or moribund, or had been transformed into private
companies, or from the beginning were private commercial businesses masquer-
ading as cooperatives. Among these, an entirely private agribusiness in Dingbian
County, Shaanxi, has been registered as a cooperative, as has a private potato-
noodle factory in Shaanxi and a private farmhouse restaurant and resort in
Yanchi County, Ningxia. A cooperative fever has hit rural China, but almost all
of the registered co-ops are far from what cooperatives were intended to be under
China’s national Cooperatives Law or by any other reasonable deﬁnition of co-
operative. Unwittingly exemplifying the confusion as to what constitutes a coop-
erative, the boss of one dairy company that had been certiﬁed as one retorted,
“How are we not a cooperative? After all, we cooperate with Mengniu Dairy Cor-
poration.”
Extensive ﬁeldwork conducted throughout China revealed that nearly any or-
ganization related to agriculture can be registered as a cooperative. This reality
forms a sharp contrast with the story portrayed in both the popular news media
and Chinese scholarly publications about the positive impact of these alleged co-
operatives to small farmers.
According to ofﬁcial data, by October 2015 approximately 1.5 million farmers’
specialized cooperatives had been registered,4 whereas as recently as 2008 there
had been only 110,000.5 It is ofﬁcially reported that about 100 million farming
households belong to cooperatives,6 which, if true, would represent some 47 per-
cent of all of China’s farmers. Scholars both inside and outside of China initially
had high hopes for the positive impact on agricultural production, farmers’ live-
lihoods, and China’s rural development. Many expected the new co-ops to spur
3. See, e.g., http://www.farmer.com.cn/xwpd/jjsn/201412/t20141212_1000677.htm (accessed October 27,
2015).
4. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/08/c_128509962.htm (accessed February 29, 2016).
5. See http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/tjzl/200903/t20090320_50532.html (accessed October 27, 2015).
6. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-12/08/c_128509962.htm (accessed February 29, 2016).
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smallholder farmers to work collectively to scale up their production, gain greater
bargaining power in markets, and secure more advantageous prices for agricul-
tural inputs and produce. The farmers were expected to pool their knowledge
and resources, and it was hoped that the co-ops would augment their social
and even political power. However, in contrast to these optimistic expectations,
we found only a tiny number of authentic cooperatives that managed to survive.
Annually, both central and local governments provide substantial subsidies to
support registered cooperatives. In 2014 the central government alone reportedly
spent RMB 2 billion (approximately US$290 million) in subsidies,7 a ﬁgure over
and above the support provided by local governments at every level. In our ﬁeld-
work, the subsidies that each cooperative received ranged from hundreds of
thousands to millions of yuan. It is these subsidies that attract a large number of
applications to register as a cooperative.
Several previous case studies have cast doubt on the validity of speciﬁc regis-
tered cooperatives and on the impact these have had on agricultural production
and rural livelihoods.8 But our article is the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to analyze
systematically both the heterogeneous types of operations that can call them-
selves cooperatives and the variety of ways they fail to deliver any beneﬁts to
smallholder farmers. We identify four types of cooperatives that failed to mea-
sure up to the standards outlined in China’s Cooperatives Law.
The ﬁrst are “shell cooperatives”—where the term “cooperative” from the start
was simply a name falsely inscribed on a plaque hung on the ofﬁce door. The
people who set these up are essentially swindlers who had no intention of engag-
ing in agricultural production or sales. These frauds have no organizational
framework and often did not even bother to recruit genuine farmers to pretend
to be members.
The second type, although registered as cooperatives, are actually private ag-
ribusinesses that have market-based transactions with participating farmers.
While they sometimes provide technology and marketing services to smallholder
farmers, these were founded and controlled by their private owners. They have
no genuine cooperation with members, nor do they share proﬁts with them.
7. See http://www.sdhzslm.com/a/tongzhigonggao/2015/0804/224801.html (accessed February 9, 2016).
8. See, e.g., Tong Zhihui and Wen Tiejun, “Ziben he bumen xiaxiang yu xiaononghu jingji de zuzhihua
daolu” [Rustication of capital and governmental sectors and the organizational pathway of the peasant econ-
omy], Kaifang shidai [Open times], no. 4 (2009): 5–26; Xiong Wansheng, “Hezuoshe: Zuowei zhiduhua
jincheng de yiwai houguo,” Shehuixue yanjiu [Sociological research], no. 5 (2009): 83–109; Pan Jin,
“Zhongguo nongmin zhuanye hezuoshe: shuju beihou de jiedu” [Specialized farmers’ cooperatives in China:
An interpretation of the data on their development], Zhongguo nongcun guancha [China rural surveys],
no. 6 (2011): 2–11; Christof Lammer, “Imagined Cooperatives: An Ethnography of Cooperation and Con-
ﬂict in New Rural Reconstruction Projects in a Chinese Village” (master’s thesis, University of Vienna,
2012); Deng Hengshan and Wang Wenlan, “Hezuoshe de benzhi guiding yu xianshi jianshi: Zhongguo
daodi you meiyou zhenzheng de nongmin hezuoshe?” [Analysis of the nature and reality of cooperatives:
Are there real farmer cooperatives in China?], Zhongguo nongcun jingji [Chinese rural economy], no. 7
(2014): 15–38.
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In reality, neither of these ﬁrst two types should ever have been classiﬁed as co-
operatives. The difference between the two is that the second has some sort of
engagement with farmers. The ﬁrst type can be a business of any type or even
not a company at all, but an entity established to attract the subsidies that the
government offers to cooperatives.
The third type, the decooperativized cooperatives, was initially relatively au-
thentic. Due primarily to market pressures, these cooperatives progressively con-
verted into commercial enterprises, no longer practiced voluntary participation
nor cooperated in bulk purchases and sales or coordinated production, demo-
cratic management, or dividend distributions.
The fourth type are cooperatives that eventually failed for various reasons, in-
cluding poor leadership, lack of management experience or skills, or hostile ex-
ternal market environments. In short, the third and fourth types began as au-
thentic cooperatives but deviated from that model due to internal and external
factors. While the fourth type has ceased operations, the third type has adapted
to market forces but at the cost of the cooperative elements of the operation.
The ﬁfth type are genuine cooperatives. Despite our best efforts, we found only
two among our 50 case studies. Both of these co-ops possess dedicated and com-
petent leaders who have helped their organization withstand various challenges.
In practice, they continue to provide beneﬁts to members and operate in accord
with any reasonable deﬁnition of cooperative.
THE HISTORY AND DEBATE OVER COOPERATIVES
The history of China’s cooperatives, though less lengthy than Europe’s, can be
traced back to the early twentieth century. Notably, between 1931 and 1936,
the founder of the Rural Reconstruction Movement, Liang Shuming, advocated
cooperatives as a third road for China, as distinct from socialism and capitalism.9
Although Mao’s regime disbanded most bottom-up cooperatives in favor of
state-organized communes in the 1950s, rural cooperatives began to reemerge
in rural China after 1998, when farmer cooperatives at the grassroots began in-
creasing markedly in number.10 These newly formed cooperatives enjoyed in-
tellectual support from university professors and activists, the best known of
whom is Professor Wen Tiejun.11 Adopting a critical approach to modernization
9. Alexander F. Day, The Peasant in Postsocialist China: History, Politics, and Capitalism (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013).
10. Xiaoping Jia, Jikun Huang, and Zhigang Xu, “Marketing of Farmer Professional Cooperatives in the
Wave of Transformed Agrofood Market in China,” China Economic Review, no. 23 (2012): 665–74. For a
detailed account of the development of cooperatives in postreform China, see Jenny Clegg, “Rural Coopera-
tives in China: Policy and Practice,” Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development. 13, no. 2 (2006):
219–34.
11. Other well-known supporters include Philip C. C. Huang and Yang Tuan.
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theory and its emphasis on industrialization, Wen advocates comprehensive
community-based cooperatives, as opposed to specialized cooperatives.12 Ac-
cording to Wen, comprehensive cooperatives should perform additional func-
tions beyond bulk purchases and sales, transport, processing, and technical sup-
port, such as organizing cultural and moral-education activities.
The central government launched pilot programs to encourage cooperatives
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, for which the Ministry of Agriculture selected
100 cooperatives nationwide to be demonstration cases. These received favorable
support and services from the government, including free training in quality con-
trol and product certiﬁcation.13
Governments at all levels, starting in 2004, began systematically promoting
farmer cooperatives (农民合作社),14 and in 2006 the National People’s Congress
passed the Farmers’ Specialized Cooperatives Law (农民专业合作社法).15 The
law deﬁnes cooperatives as “mutual-aid economic organizations joined volun-
tarily and managed democratically by the producers of the same kind of agri-
cultural products or by the suppliers or users of services for the same kind of
agricultural production and operation, based on the fundamental household re-
sponsibility system” (art. 2).16 The main difference between China’s Cooperatives
Law and the International Cooperative Alliance’s deﬁnition is that the Chinese
law does not mention comprehensive community-based cooperatives or credit
cooperatives. Instead, the law focuses more narrowly on cooperatives that assist
agricultural production and marketing of speciﬁc types of agricultural produce.17
The law provides principles and application procedures for cooperatives that
are broadly consistent with international standards. Registered cooperatives are
supposed to adhere to the following: (1) membership is constituted mainly of
12. Wen Tiejun, “Zonghe xing hezuo jingji zuzhi shi fazhan qushi” [Comprehensive cooperative eco-
nomic organization is the development trend], Zhongguo Hezuo Jingji [China co-operation economy], no. 1
(2011): 29–30; Wen Tiejun and Yang Shuai, “Zhongguo nongcun shehui jiegou bianhua beijingxia de
xiangcun zhili yu nongcun fazhan” [Rural governance and rural development in the context of social struc-
tural transformation in rural China], Lilun Tantao [Theoretical investigation] 169, no. 6 (2012): 76–80.
13. Hengshan Deng, Jikun Huang, Zhigang Xu, and Scott Rozelle, “Policy Support and Emerging Farmer
Professional Cooperatives in Rural China”, China Economic Review, no. 21 (2010): 495–507..
14. Jia, Huang and Xu, “Marketing of Farmer Professional Cooperatives.”
15. This is when formally formed cooperatives of all types began being referred to as Farmers’ Special-
ized Cooperatives (农民专业合作社). The law came into effect in July 2007.
16. See http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/ﬂfg/2006–10/31/content_429392.htm (accessed October 28, 2015). This
is comparable with international deﬁnitions such as that of the International Co-operative Alliance; see
http://ica.coop/en/what-co-operative (accessed October 28, 2015).
17. While China’s Cooperatives Law does not recognize credit cooperatives, the China Banking Regula-
tory Commission (CBRC) has approved a number of rural mutual credit cooperatives. The CBRC launched
the rural mutual credit cooperatives regulations in 2007. In recent years, the registered mutual credit co-
ops have grown remarkably, though their numbers remain dwarfed by the registered agricultural coopera-
tives.
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farmers; (2) the cooperative’s mission should be to serve its members and to
work for their common interests; (3) members are free to join and withdraw
from membership; (4) members enjoy equal status, and democratic management
must apply; and (5) proﬁts should be distributed proportionally according to the
volume of the transactions between the cooperative and its members (art. 3).
The application procedure used to register a new cooperative is both simple
and straightforward. The minimum number needed for registration at the local
government Industrial and Commercial Bureau is ﬁve members, and there is no
mandatory requirement for registered capital.18 Most important, as will be ob-
served, in practice the Chinese law’s stringent rules are bypassed and ignored
when applicants go to register a so-called cooperative.
Since the law is simultaneously too stringently deﬁned and too loosely enforced,
we needed to adopt our own standards to deﬁne the minimal requirements for
judging what is and is not a cooperative. In evaluating our cases, we ignored the
democratic management principle and dividend distributions to members, and
we focused on whether a registered cooperative functioned as a cooperative in pro-
viding members with either bulk input purchasing and marketing, branding, and/
or technical services. For the purposes of this article, in order to be considered a
cooperative:
• First, it should be voluntarily formed by and made up of members specializing
in the same kind of agricultural activity, who are independent producers or
suppliers, instead of hired employees.
• Second, the members collectively own the cooperative’s assets, if any.
• Third, the members beneﬁt through at least one of the following ways:
– the proﬁts (if any) of the cooperative are proportionally distributed to
members;
– and/or the cooperative provides additional beneﬁts exclusively to mem-
bers, such as bulk input purchasing, collective marketing, branding, and/
or technical services
• Fourth, even if a cooperative contains a handful or even one especially large or
even dominant player, as long as the rest are members with shares who enjoy
the beneﬁts listed above, we consider this to be a genuine cooperative. But
we exclude cases where a so-called cooperative keeps all the proﬁts and these
are not shared among the member households.
18. Favorable central and local policies designed to encourage and foster the growth of cooperatives sup-
plement this central legal framework; Deng et al., “Policy Support.”
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We were surprised that so few of the registered cooperatives that we visited meet
even these minimum standards.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Our research spans a seven-year period (2009–16) and covers all of China’s
macroregions, 18 provinces in total (see table 1). Examining diverse provinces
is important because the implementation of central government policies nearly
always varies across different provincial and even local governments.
China’s central and provincial governments publish annual lists of thousands
of high-performing cooperatives in all subsectors of agriculture to hold up as na-
tional and regional demonstration cooperatives. With these lists, we adopted a
purposive sampling strategy to ensure the inclusion of a wide range of speciali-
zations and geographic areas. In addition, we asked scholars and activists for
their suggestions of authentic cooperatives to visit. We visited not only model
cooperatives in China’s fertile plains and near large cities such as Beijing and
Shanghai but also in remote mountainous and desert areas, such as a semidesert
village in Ningxia province and a remote mountain village in Shaanxi province.
We supplemented “model” cases with cooperatives that had not received outside
recognition by seeking them out in every locality we visited. We sometimes
chanced upon registered cooperatives, or they were referred to us during local
interviews. We believe this snowballing approach enhanced the representative-
ness of our sample and gave us an opportunity to identify cooperatives that are
neglected by ofﬁcials or the media.
Despite our efforts, it remains possible that we missed ﬁnding some very
small-scale, grassroots cooperatives that are informally organized and unregis-
tered with the government. Thus, there may be a higher number of authentic co-
operatives than our research would lead us to believe. However, if a cooperative
that focuses on agricultural production were authentic and successful, regardless
of its size, we would expect that it would be referred to us locally, promoted by
an activist, or publicized somewhere in China. Groups of progressively minded
scholars in China pay close attention to cooperatives, both large and small, and
these scholars could be expected to discover genuine cooperatives. Thus, given
their efforts and our long-term and extensive geographical range of ﬁeldwork,
the fact that they and we could ﬁnd very few indicates that genuine cooperatives
are indeed scarce.
To secure information at our ﬁeld sites, we adopted in-depth interviewing in
order to obtain more comprehensive information than standardized question-
naires. At each ﬁeld site, we triangulated information from interviews with coop-
erative leaders by interviewing a number of others from the same community,
including village ofﬁcials, co-op employees, and especially member farmers and
Farmers’ Cooperatives in China • 7
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neighboring nonmember farmers. In many cases, this range of interviews uncov-
ered the tensions and contradictions regarding registered cooperatives. It was
not unusual to ﬁnd that the leaders’ claims about the many beneﬁts the cooper-
ative brought to farmers were emphatically rejected time and again in interviews
conducted independently with members, which underscores the pitfalls of relying
on leaders as informants.
We also visited a handful of cooperatives twice during the seven-year period to
look for changes over time. This, combined with the recollections of interviewees
at all 50 sites, provides a picture of the moribund state of China’s cooperatives
today, including almost all of those that started out as genuine. Our research en-
abled us to understand the development processes, causes, and impacts of the
cooperatives.
THE FIVE TYPES OF COOPERATIVES
Table 1 shows the general information from our 50 case studies of registered co-
operatives, arranged in the ﬁve types we listed earlier.
Type 1: Shell Cooperatives
This type consists of organizations that in no way adhere to any reasonable
deﬁnition of a cooperative. They have no actual member farmers. Many of the
ﬁve founders needed to register the cooperative are individuals who lent their
identiﬁcation cards to the registrant to qualify for registration. Establishing a fake
cooperative is possible because the eligibility for registering a cooperative is so low
that basically any private company or even a household can easily register as one.
Among the registered cooperatives we visited, a substantial proportion (30 per-
cent)—including many of those ofﬁcially listed as model cooperatives—belong to
this category. Many of these are not even related in any way to agricultural pro-
duction; and those that are do not meaningfully interact with farmers.
As our ﬁeldwork revealed, shell cooperative leaders are motivated mainly to
obtain the sizeable subsidies that are speciﬁcally allocated to cooperatives or to
help local governments to meet their policy implementation goal (in this case,
supporting the growth of cooperatives). According to national policies, the sub-
sidies come in various forms, including direct payments, loans, tax consider-
ations, and subcontracted development projects. Local governments often blindly
encourage the establishment of cooperatives, including fake shell cooperatives, in
order to demonstrate their achievements to their superiors. Since both entrepre-
neurs and local ofﬁcials alike have incentives to establish shell cooperatives, there
is little or no inspection of an application’s validity, and monitoring thereafter re-
mains lax. Below are two examples.
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A Dairy Cooperative in Ningxia
A dairy company that we visited in Ningxia province is a typical private enter-
prise that has registered as a cooperative. This “cooperative” was founded by
Mr. Niu, who has devoted himself to his dairy business for more than 20 years.
He has more than 1,000 dairy cows, with a dozen full-time employees. His reg-
istered cooperative has no actual members and he has no interaction with other
farmers. The front door of Mr. Niu’s company is nevertheless adorned by a
nameplate that announces it is a dairy cooperative.
A Vegetable and Pig Cooperative in Shaanxi
Similarly, the Fengshou cooperative in a county in Shaanxi province is actually a
large private agricultural ﬁrm that grows greenhouse vegetables and raises pigs.
Mr. Zhu, the owner, is a businessman who has accumulated capital via the con-
struction industry and who began investing in agriculture in 2011. Now the com-
pany has become a leading agribusiness in the county. Mr. Zhu invited four
friends who are businesspeople in the construction and service sectors to make
up the ﬁve needed to register as a cooperative. Ninety percent of the company’s
RMB 50 million startup capital came from the founder. Although the cooperative
was selected as a model demonstration cooperative, it is in fact a fake, without
any participation by or beneﬁts distributed to farmers.
Type 2: De Facto Private Agribusinesses
The second major form of cooperatives are essentially private agribusinesses that
operate under the guise of a cooperative, and that, unlike type 1, have market-
based transactions with farmers, both members and nonmembers. But their trans-
actions are entirely commercial and for the owner’s private proﬁt. Most of these
so-called cooperatives boast physical infrastructure (such as ofﬁces and comput-
ers), can present visitors with paperwork that make them seem like a cooperative
(including sheets of paper showing the cooperative’s rules, procedures, manage-
ment structures, leadership and democratic practices), and have participating
member farmers listed in their books. But while these agribusinesses conduct
transactions with so-called members, their activities, including providing techni-
cal and marketing services, are conducted in a completely commercial manner,
not in ways consistent with a cooperative.19
One distinct feature is that they are controlled by and serve the interests of a
small elite group or one core leader. The three types of actors who typically es-
19. For details on how agribusinesses operate and on the different forms of relationships they adopt with
smallholder farmers, see Qian Forrest Zhang and John A. Donaldson, “The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism with
Chinese Characteristics: Agricultural Modernization, Agribusiness and Collective Land Rights,” China Jour-
nal, no. 60 (July 2008): 25–48.
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tablish and control these commercial cooperatives are entrepreneurs and current
or former village leaders.20 Below are three such examples.
A Hazelnut Cooperative in Liaoning Province
Mr. Zhen is the manager and de facto leader of this hazelnut cooperative, which
has about 20 member producers. The combined size of members’ individual
farms adds up to over 30,000 mu of land.21 By renting the land of other farmers,
Zhen now operates a hazelnut farm on 40 mu of arable land, on which he culti-
vates seedlings that he sells to other producers. Through his experience in hazel-
nut cultivation, he has accumulated abundant management skills and was grow-
ing patented hazelnut varieties. The local government and local hazelnut growers
often rely on him to provide technical support on hazelnut farming. In turn, his
hard-earned reputation facilitates his own businesses, which includes providing
timely technological services, such as applying pesticides and curing diseases, as
well as selling hazelnut seedlings and other inputs to both member and non-
member farmers.
Mr. Zhen himself readily acknowledges that this cooperative is not authentic.
He charges to provide services to both members and nonmembers indiscrimi-
nately and even nurtures seedlings for clients from other provinces, including In-
ner Mongolia and Shandong. Zhen’s experience and technical expertise is the
core element that unites this organization, which never has signiﬁcant actual co-
operation among member producers, let alone proﬁt sharing or other elements of
an actual farmers’ cooperative.
A Rice Cooperative in Liaoning Province
The village head, Mr. Fan, founded this cooperative in 2009. It was recently selected
as a province-level demonstration cooperative and claims more than 1,000 house-
hold members with 19,000 mu of farmland not only in the village but also in other
counties. It boasts a rice processing factory and its own brand of rice. Though reg-
istered as a cooperative, interviews with local villagers reveal that the enterprise
functions no differently from a private agribusiness company, acquiring huge
swaths of land from land transfers within and outside the village.22 While the
cooperative claims that member farmers receive dividends, members we inter-
20. Large-scale urban corporations entering into agricultural production can also establish commercial
cooperatives, although we did not discover such cases during our ﬁeldwork.
21. This land includes a small proportion of arable land, as well as much larger acreage of either un-
developed land or slope land.
22. Mr. Fan rebuffed our efforts to interview him. One staff member was dispatched to urge us to con-
tact the city government ﬁrst; Mr. Fan would meet us only if a formal introduction letter from the govern-
ment could be produced. We pointed out, to no avail, that many leaders of cooperatives were willing to talk
to us. We did, however, talk to cooperative staff and member farmers.
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viewed counter that the only payment they have received so far was the rent for
their transferred farmland, around RMB 800 per mu annually, a standard market
price for that area. No actual cooperative relationship exists betweenmember farm-
ers and the cooperative. The rent also ﬂuctuates with the market price of rice, in-
dicating that the risk is still borne by farmers. Farmers who are not members of
the cooperative can sell their rice to the cooperative on the same terms as mem-
bers. Hence, instead of deeming the farmers to be members of this “cooperative,”
it is more accurate to say they are clients of this agricultural company. The coop-
erative received RMB 5 million in subsidies from the government, but the mem-
bers received none of it. Members who wanted to quit report that the leaders
threatened to cut off their irrigation water, plant trees alongside their land, or oth-
erwise obstruct their farms. These stories reﬂect a poor relationship between the
cooperative’s so-called leaders and its members. One farmer dismissed the coop-
erative as like “a landlord from the old times.” There are no real beneﬁts to being a
member. Indeed, membership has become a form of bondage rather than a priv-
ilege.
A Vegetable Cooperative in Shaanxi Province
Mr. Luo, then the village head, established this cooperative in 2008. It has sub-
sequently grown to become a demonstration cooperative at the national level
for the production of carrots. Luo, the chair of the cooperative’s board, claims
more than 600 household members, a 1,000 mu carrot base,23 his own brand
of carrot, and annual revenue in excess of RMB 10 million. Luo argues that the
cooperative provides comprehensive services for member farmers, including or-
ganizing farmers to plant carrots, helping farmers select varieties, providing
inputs and technological guidance, and helping market the produce. However,
member farmers we interviewed universally contradicted these claims. Most farm-
ers reported that the main service of the cooperative is selling seeds and buy-
ing produce at the prevailing market price. Member farmers are not obliged to
sell their carrots to the cooperative and are free to sell to other merchants who
also operate purchasing stations in the area. For all practical purposes, this coop-
erative operates as a private agribusiness, producing its own crops, but also sells
inputs to and buys produce from farmers. The ownership and revenues of the
cooperative belong to the handful of founders, who invested RMB 200,000 each
at the beginning and over time subsequently invested more than ten million yuan
into this enterprise. They also received a few hundred thousand yuan in subsidies
23. This land is rented from a local state-owned farm. While this farm previously grew alfalfa for sheep,
it was managed so poorly that the land was rented out for more proﬁt. The term “base” (基地) is commonly
used in Chinese academic and ofﬁcial writing to refer to production on expanses of land that are far larger
than small family plots.
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from governments at various levels. Farmers do not have any real ownership over
the cooperative.
Type 3: Decooperativized Cooperatives
These are organizations that started off as authentic cooperatives that have now
abandoned their original mission. Instead of serving the needs of members, these
cooperatives are focused on commercial activities that have nothing to do with
their members. Most of the assets are from external large-scale investors. Thus,
these organizations are not made up of farmers engaging in the same kind of ac-
tivity, and the members do not meaningfully own the assets. While members can
potentially beneﬁt, serving the members is a small portion of the entire opera-
tion, and members have become more like customers and/or minority share-
holders of a commercial operation. We were surprised that we could unearth
only one such example.
A Decooperativized Mutual Credit Cooperative in Jilin Province
In 1999, long before the establishment of China’s law on cooperatives, eight
small-scale sheep farmers informally collectively formed an authentic farmers’
cooperative without seeking registration. To buffer themselves from the vaga-
ries of a volatile market, the sheep herders formed a mutual credit cooperative,
through which they pledged to help each other with expenses and ﬁnances. For
years, this cooperative operated successfully but grew only slowly. Subsequently,
the cooperative received help from a dedicated activist, Mr. Qian, a government
ofﬁcial in the local bureaucracy who deals with ﬁnance. Mr. Qian helped the
cooperative take the unprecedented step to obtain a banking license in 2007—
something that would have been impossible for ordinary rural residents.24 The
capital of the credit cooperative was mainly sourced from deposits and member-
ship shares, with ﬁnancial support from local governments and cash borrowed
from interbank loans. Obtaining the license by itself did not undermine the or-
ganization’s status as an authentic cooperative: prospective borrowers had to be
cooperative members, and the loans were used to support agricultural operations
and living expenses. By 2010, the total assets of the credit cooperative remained
a modest RMB 390,000.25 Subsequently, the cooperative, which remained largely
conﬁned to its original membership, became dormant, and loans to members
ceased.
However, by the time of our interviews in 2015, the cooperative had been
completely transformed. A relative of Mr. Qian saw the value of the cooperative’s
24. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2014-08/18/c_126885269.htm (accessed September 1, 2016).
25. See http://www.caein.com/index.asp?xActionpxReadNews&NewsIDp57627 (accessed October 15,
2015).
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banking license. He took the reins of the organization, bringing in tens of mil-
lions of yuan in external capital by leveraging the organization’s banking license.
By doing so, he transformed what had been a small-scale cooperative among
farmers into a full-ﬂedged commercial bank. The cooperative’s ofﬁces in the vil-
lage are now comparable to rural branch ofﬁces of typical commercial banks. In-
terviews with the bank’s manager revealed that the lion’s share of the capital de-
rives from external private investors, whose identities he would not divulge.
Seeking new outside investors has become part of the managers’ mission, and
the erstwhile cooperative sought to increase its proﬁts by directly investing in
a variety of undertakings, such as restaurants and hotels.26
Thus, what had originally started out as an authentic grassroots cooperative
underwent a process of decooperativization. After a “corporate takeover” of the
dormant cooperative, it became dominated by external commercial capital and
started to serve the capital holders through seeking higher returns from commer-
cial investments. The members continued to be members in name and can still
deposit and apply for loans from the bank. However, their relationship with
the organization has become more like that of an ordinary bank customer. Mem-
bers hold a tiny minority of the shares in the bank, and as such they receive
small dividends in proﬁt sharing. But they no longer have any kind of input into
the bank’s operations or any meaningful ownership over the assets. Lending to
members has become only a small part of its total operations—and this kind of
microcredit service became almost like a part of the bank’s corporate social re-
sponsibility, rather than its core function. The organization is still ofﬁcially a co-
operative, but it has lost its essence as a cooperative.
Type 4: Failed Cooperatives
Type 4 were once authentic cooperatives that worked well in the beginning, but
subsequently failed for a variety of reasons such as mismanagement, corrupted
leadership, or unfavorable market conditions. Two examples of well-known co-
operatives can illuminate this.27
26. This seems to violate relevant China Banking Regulatory Commission’s regulations, which state that
credit cooperatives can only absorb capital from three sources: member deposit, charitable donations and
funds raised from banks (chap. 6, art. 39). Credit cooperatives should not absorb deposits or offer loans to
nonmembers (chap. 6, art. 42). See China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), “Zhongguo yinjianhui
bangongting guanyu yinfa ‘nongcun zijin huzhushe shifan zhangcheng’ de tongzhi” [Notice from CBRC re-
garding the rules of rural credit cooperatives], no. 51 (2007), available at http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese
/home/docDOC_ReadView/20070215C5084335DFA16921FFACA83015710500.html (accessed June 2, 2016).
27. We use real names in the discussion of these two cases, which are among the most widely known
and studied cases throughout China. Most of the evidence used here is public information. The informants
we directly interviewed remain anonymous.
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Xiajia Farmer Cooperative in Lishu County, Jilin
Established in 2000, this was one of postreform China’s earliest farmer cooper-
atives. As described in the introduction, a local villager, Zhang Shuxiang, was the
initiator and chair of the cooperative. She had originally had aspirations to attend
university, but her entrance examination scores fell just short of what was needed
to pass. After holding a series of jobs, she began pig farming in 1992. After build-
ing her scale in pig farming, Zhang sought to increase her bargaining power in
the pig market in 1999 by cooperating with six other pig farmers in her village
to purchase pig feed together at somewhat reduced prices and to sell live pigs to-
gether at a slightly higher price. Other pig farmers in the village enthusiastically
joined the informal group, which soon led to the formal establishment of the
Xiajia Farmer Cooperative. In a few months, the cooperative’s membership mul-
tiplied, reaching 70 households. In addition to uniﬁed purchases and sales of
most agricultural inputs and outputs, the main activities of the cooperative were
initially to provide training and education services and mutual aid among the
members. By 2006, the cooperative boasted 172 member households, claimed
to have saved RMB 170,000 through uniﬁed purchase of agricultural inputs,
and alleged to have made RMB 13 million in sales volume and RMB 930,000
in net income.28 In 2004, the cooperative received a RMB 150,000 subsidy from
local governments, and they used RMB 82,000 to build a small feed-processing
factory serving the members.29
Zhang soon became a nationally popular role model for leading farmers to
pursue common prosperity. She attended numerous training sessions organized
by international organizations such as the International Co-operative Alliance
regarding the rules, procedures, and skills of managing a cooperative. Xiajia Co-
operative also had a well-designed governance structure that was broadly consis-
tent with the Chinese law and the international principles of cooperatives. In
2003, it was selected as a national demonstration farmer cooperative, a status
it sustained until 2014, with numerous visitors and accolades. With so much sup-
port from the government and goodwill from the public, most expected that
Xiajia could overcome the challenges that other cooperatives faced and would
continue to ﬂourish.
However, by August 2015, as noted earlier, the cooperative had completely
shut down. Villagers reported that while members beneﬁtted from the co-op’s
increased bargaining power when purchasing inputs and in sales prices, as the
28. Yu Luna, “Zhang Shuxiang de banshee zhidao: zhonghao ‘wutongshu’ caineng yinlai ‘jinfenghuang’”
[The approach of Zhang Shuxiang’s cooperative: Planting Firmiana trees to attract phoenixes], Zhongguo
Hezuo Jingji [Chinese Cooperation Economy], no. 11 (2007): 22–23. It should be noted that we are doubtful
of the accuracy of the large revenue and net proﬁt. We present them here only for reference.
29. Yuan Peng and Zhao Jun, “Yige funu chengqi bantian de hezuoshe” [A woman’s cooperative],
Zhongguo Hezuo Jingji [Chinese cooperative economy], no. 11 (2007): 17–21.
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cooperative expanded it encountered numerous problems. For instance, the feed-
processing factory operated at a loss due to the leadership group’s lack of man-
agement skills and experience. Contrasting with claims of impressive ﬁnancial
success, the cooperative ran short of capital. The original subsidy received from
the government was never augmented by other external ﬁnancial support. The
shareholding capital from members was too meager to sustain the factory, which
shut down in the late 2000s. Also, the cooperative was unable to predict overall
market trends at a time of dramatic ﬂuctuations in the national pork market.
Amidst these problems, the locals complained that the renowned founder had
become less dedicated over time: as one cooperative manager put it, “she later
became selﬁsh.” Ms. Zhang had borrowed money from members of the cooper-
ative under the pretext of supporting its activities but was unable to pay the loans
back. In the end, she ﬂed, forcing her creditors to take legal actions against her.
Nanmazhuang Organic Rice Cooperative, Henan Province
The Nanmazhuang cooperative was established in 2004, with considerable sup-
port from the Rural Reconstruction School. Two prominent scholars served as
advisors: He Huili, a sociology professor from China Agricultural University,
who had been seconded to the Lankao County government for several years,
as well as the intellectual leader of the rural cooperative movement, Wen Tiejun
of Renmin University.30 In the beginning, the cooperative helped members coor-
dinate the planting and management of organic rice. By 2006, in order to in-
crease the proﬁtability of organic rice, the cooperative established a shareholding
system, with 20 members investing between RMB 5,000 and RMB 100,000 each
to establish a rice-processing factory. However, as a member farmer said, this fac-
tory operated at a loss as of 2008 and closed in 2009 due to poor management. At
that point, the factory was transferred to the leaders and became a private com-
pany. Although the cooperative still has members, the number has dwindled and
the remaining members gradually lost trust in the leading group. Many farmers
began selling their rice to other market traders. The rice cooperative still exists
nominally, but it has failed as a cooperative and at best operates on a weak “com-
pany plus farmer” model.
The failure can be ascribed to three primary reasons. First, the cooperative did
not arise as a spontaneous initiative of the farmers but rather was fostered pri-
marily by outside scholars. That did not inherently lead to failure, yet according
to former cooperative members, the cooperative lacked a foundation of trust
within the community. Second, the leaders of the cooperative lacked sufﬁcient
management skills to run a market-oriented factory, further undermining trust
in the remaining operations. Third, according to one well-regarded source, in-
30. The involvement of the school mirrors the involvement of prerevolution intellectuals such as Liang
Shuming in the 1930s.
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tense competition and conﬂict among different lineages and cliques in the village
further eroded the trust needed for cooperation.31
Type 5: Genuine Cooperatives
Of the 50 cooperatives that we studied in 18 different provinces, we found only
two that can be considered authentic and successful.
Riverbend Comprehensive Farmers’ Cooperative, Shanxi Province
Riverbend is a large self-governing mutual-help community with 113 full-time
employees and 3,865 household members across two rural townships.32 It started
as an agricultural technological service center and a women’s dance association,
initiated by a local teacher who had dedicated her life to transforming the back-
wardness of her rural community. Among Riverbend’s broad-based initiatives
are two successful authentic cooperatives. The ﬁrst is an umbrella agricultural co-
operative, made up of 22 separately registered smaller cooperatives uniﬁed under
a single professional management team. These 22 branches each have a distinct
membership base that specializes in one crop (such as grain, fruits) or livestock.
In addition to collective purchases of inputs and sales of produce, the cooperative
organizes the processing of organic wheat, oil seeds, and vegetables and directly
delivers these foods to customers in two nearby cities.
Riverbend also operates an authentic, highly proﬁtable credit cooperative.
This is funded primarily from members’ deposits and shares, and it lends exclu-
sively to members to support their agricultural activities. Thanks to a large and
loyal membership base, the credit cooperative’s scale is large; its annual lending
ranges between RMB 20 and 30 million. With a 15 percent annual interest rate,
these loans generate proﬁts in the order of millions for the cooperative.
All the members of both the agricultural and credit cooperatives are exclu-
sively small producers from the community, and the modest physical assets of
the cooperatives (all of its facilities are stationed inside unoccupied houses rented
from their owners) are collectively owned by the members. The cooperative dis-
tributes most of the proﬁts to the members, and the remaining proﬁts help fund a
range of social services provided to the broader community.
The cooperatives in Riverbend remain successful and authentic for a number
of reasons. First, the cooperatives were formed as part of a broader local move-
31. Zhao Xiaofeng, Xinxing nongmin hezuoshe fazhan de shehui jizhi yanjiu [Social dynamics of China’s
new rural cooperatives] (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2015).
32. Researchers sometimes label this a “farmer’s association” because it covers multiple socioeconomic
and cultural functions. It provides a range of services, including elder care, children’s educational activities,
and cultural activities. For more information about the broader community, see, for example, Zhao, Xinxing
nongmin hezuoshe.
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ment that spent nearly a decade organizing the community and promoting social
cohesion and mutual help. Second, the leaders remain deeply dedicated to serv-
ing the cooperative, its members, and the community, and they have steadfastly
resisted the temptation either to maximize the cooperative’s proﬁts or to pursue
their own personal ﬁnancial interests. For instance, the leaders say they are proud
that they turned down government subsidies in order to protect their manage-
ment autonomy from government interference and inﬂuence. In addition, they
decided to scale down the community’s commercially successful handicraft co-
operative because they believed it was beginning to stoke distrust and tension
among the cooperative’s members, as it was causing them to compete against
each other at the cost of other priorities.
However, even the successful umbrella cooperative has not been very success-
ful in increasing the proﬁtability of agricultural production. Economically, the
community beneﬁts most from the operations of the credit cooperative, not from
the agricultural initiatives of the agricultural cooperative. The savings from joint
purchases of agricultural inputs and beneﬁts from the sales of agricultural prod-
ucts constitute only a small portion of farmers’ income. Moreover, some of the
branches that focus on nonorganic crops have performed poorly and have pro-
vided disappointingly modest beneﬁts to members, despite their best efforts.
Most of the beneﬁts stem from the dividends and access to credit. It is notable,
though, that both the agricultural cooperative and the credit cooperative are au-
thentic.
Northpoint Farmers’ Cooperative, Anhui Province
Mr. Quan formed the Northpoint farmers’ cooperative in 2004, after spending
eight years organizing farmers to resist excessive rural taxes imposed by a rapa-
cious local government. As farmers organized petitions and protests, they devel-
oped a sense of solidarity and trust among themselves. This sense of group feel-
ing led in turn to formally organized cultural and leisure activities of various
kinds. Soon afterward, the farmers leveraged their sense of efﬁcacy into an agri-
cultural cooperative for the bulk purchase of inputs and then, a year later, a credit
cooperative.
These have had mixed results. Most members continued to grow grain, pri-
marily corn, and the cooperative did not engage in branding or joint marketing
of members’ produce. An initiative by the cooperative to establish its own farm
failed after only a couple of years. Today, the cooperative has almost totally with-
drawn from supporting agricultural production, with bulk purchases making
only a marginal difference, and participation in this is not exclusive to coopera-
tive members. The cooperative leaders now mostly focus on the credit coopera-
tive and cultural activities, as well as entering into commercial activities, such
as opening a distillery and a nursery school, neither of which directly involves
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members. The provision of credit, which is smaller in scale than in Riverbend,
is the co-op’s greatest beneﬁt. Riverbend’s use of credit helped some farmers
switch production to organic agriculture. While this allows the credit and agri-
cultural cooperatives to complement each other, Northpoint lacks coordinated
efforts like this to improve agricultural incomes. Therefore, the credit only sup-
ports individual farmers’ own initiatives, diminishing its impact. Nevertheless,
the cooperative currently serves most effectively as an authentic credit coopera-
tive that brings substantial beneﬁts to members, and some of the proﬁts are used
to fund cultural activities and nurture community spirit.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although the ofﬁcially recorded number of cooperatives has increased rapidly,
based on our extensive ﬁeldwork, most of these are not authentic cooperatives.
In most cases, they are dominated by private interests. In this sense, cooperatives
have become an instrument of social and economic differentiation, rather than
addressing the common needs of smallholders.
Some of these so-called cooperatives do beneﬁt farmers, but they do so
through the same mechanism that some agribusinesses employ: by providing
an outlet for the marketing of farmers’ crops.33 At their worst, they cheat farmers
out of their livelihood and abscond with subsidies intended to support authentic
cooperation, which was the intention behind China’s Cooperatives Law. Instead,
many of the registered cooperatives exacerbate China’s policy bias that favors
large-scale private agricultural producers.34 Indeed, most of the cooperatives that
we examined operate as private agribusinesses and call themselves cooperatives
in order to receive government subsidies and many other kinds of support. With
these subsidies, they often compete at an unfair advantage against smallholder
farmers, adding further pressure to the farmers’ viability.
As our sample shows, only a handful of cooperatives—ﬁve out of 50 cases—
were genuine co-ops initiated by smallholder farmers. Yet by the time we visited
these—including some that were still highly lauded by the central government
and others—they either had decooperativized, become largely dormant, or gone
bankrupt. While we eagerly sought authentic cooperatives to examine, what we
largely found were commercial enterprises controlled by ofﬁcials, business entre-
preneurs, and merchants.
33. See, e.g., Zhang and Donaldson, “Rise of Agrarian Capitalism.”
34. On this policy bias, see Weigang Gong and Qian Forrest Zhang, “Betting on the Big: State-Brokered
Land Transfers, Large-scale Agricultural Producers, and Rural Policy Implementation,” China Journal 77
(January 2017): 1–26; Qiangqiang Luo, Joel Andreas, and Yao Li, “Grapes of Wrath: Twisting Arms to Get
Villagers to Cooperate with Agribusiness in China,” China Journal 77 (January 2017): 27–50.
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Why did we ﬁnd so few? It was not for lack of effort. As noted in the meth-
odology section, in addition to visiting model cooperatives extolled by the gov-
ernment or written up in the media or academic reports, we used word of mouth
and other means to seek genuine cooperatives, Yet we discovered only ﬁve, three
of which are either dormant or no longer authentic cooperatives.
On the other hand, we found a number of agribusinesses registered as coop-
eratives that are beneﬁcial to agricultural production. Through them, some farm-
ers have enjoyed a modest boost to their incomes, as well as assistance in mar-
keting agricultural produce. But the beneﬁts to ordinary farmers remain limited,
while the lion’s share of the revenue accrues to the individual or the small leader-
ship group that effectively owns the so-called cooperatives. In any case, the vision
of cooperatives as organizations of farmers helping each other overcome the dif-
ﬁculties of the modern economy has gone unfulﬁlled.
More broadly, our research left us pessimistic about rural China’s current po-
litical, social, and economic situation. First, in many rural localities farmers have
become increasingly polarized in terms of scale of production and income. We
believe that this kind of market-driven economic and social differentiation has
largely undermined the social basis needed for signiﬁcant collective action or
mutual help.35 This helps to explain why some larger producers form inauthentic
cooperatives in order to receive personal beneﬁts using the pretense that these go
to a broad membership of their neighbors (type 2) and also why some authentic
cooperatives have changed their character when their leaders pursued proﬁts for
themselves (type 3).
Because of this differentiation, cooperatives face a serious collective action
problem in an increasingly atomized rural society. Overcoming this often re-
quires social cooperation that contributes to social cohesion and trust—this must
precede, not follow, economic cooperation.36 Moreover, this social cohesion and
trust often relies on dedicated, selﬂess leaders. After all, overcoming collective ac-
35. He Anhua, Shao Feng, and Kong Xiangzhi, “Ziyuan bingfu chayi yu hezuo liyi fenpei—Liaoning
sheng HS nongmin zhuanye hezuoshe anli fenxi” [Difference of resource endowments and distribution of
cooperative interests: Based on a case of HS farmers’ specialized cooperative in Liaoning Province], Jiang
Huai Tribune, no. 1 (2012): 11–18; Yan Hairong and Chen Yiyuan, “Debating the Rural Cooperative Move-
ment in China: the Past and the Present,” Journal of Peasant Studies 40, no. 6 (2013): 955–81; Qian Forrest
Zhang and John A. Donaldson, “From Peasants to Farmers: Peasant Differentiation, Labor Regimes, and
Land Rights Institutions in China’s Agrarian Transition,” Politics & Society 38, no. 4 (2010): 458–89; Qian
Forrest Zhang, “Class Differentiation in Rural China: Dynamics of Accumulation, Commodiﬁcation and
State Intervention,” Journal of Agrarian Change 15, no. 3 (2015): 338–65; He Xuefeng, “Quxiao
nongyeshuihou nongcun de jieceng jiqi fenxi” [The analysis of rural social classes after the abolition of agri-
cultural taxes], Shehui Kexue [Social sciences], no. 3 (2006): 70–79.
36. Ellinor Ostrom, “Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6,
no. 4 (1994): 527–62; Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000); Ruerd Ruben and Jorge Heras, “Social Capital, Governance and Per-
formance of Ethiopian Coffee Cooperatives,” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 83, no. 4 (2012):
463–84.
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tion problems is difﬁcult even in the best of circumstances. As the owner of one
agribusiness “cooperative” frankly related, “it is not realistic for farmers to be
shareholders in China. What’s important is whether farmers can beneﬁt” from
their business operations. Many farmers we interviewed suggested that they want
to cooperate together but lamented the lack of resources or a focal point around
which to organize.
One such focal point is the leader of the Riverbend cooperative. When asked
about the factors that made the co-op successful, members typically focused on
their chairperson, Ms. Zheng. They were convinced that without her, the coop-
erative could never have formed. A good leader can work to develop genuine
trust, the lifeblood of rural cooperatives. Yet such a person is increasingly rare
in this materialistic and commercialized society. The leader has to adhere to
principles of cooperation and mutual beneﬁt and must sacriﬁce his or her self-
interest for the greater good. Such capable leaders often enjoy numerous oppor-
tunities to engage in commercial activities. The temptation is high for a talented
leader to seek to increase proﬁts by eroding the cooperative’s essence.
Third, the market has largely impeded, not supported, the establishment of
authentic cooperatives. The intrusion of external capital in the form of agribusi-
ness has already established market-based, capitalistic relations with farmers.37
While such relationships fall short of the cooperative ideal they have brought
some beneﬁts to farmers, such as vertical integration. This reduces farmers’ in-
centives to cooperate, thus undermining the incentive to establish cooperatives.
Fourth, the Cooperatives Law, combined with the related subsidies and gov-
ernment support, is an example of poor policy design and implementation. While
local governments are tasked with subsidizing cooperatives’ activities, the selection
standards are often ambiguous and poorly regulated. This creates opportunities
for the misapplication of funds, cronyism, and corruption.38 The subsidies are
rarely applied as intended. As the hazelnut cooperativemanager,Mr. Zhen, noted,
“Applying for subsidies depends on connections with government ofﬁcials.”
While groups of small-scale farmers typically lack the wherewithal to secure such
subsidies, well-connected, larger-scale farmers and businesses often capture ben-
eﬁts to which they are not legally entitled. Consequently, authentic bottom-up co-
operatives that need government support have difﬁculty acquiring it.
These four barriers notwithstanding, China’s authentic cooperatives, though
dispiritingly few in number and often struggling, hold fast as inspiriting anom-
alies that provide not only material beneﬁts to individual farmers but also invalu-
able community beneﬁts. However, their material beneﬁts do not derive primar-
37. Zhang and Donaldson, “Rise of Agrarian Capitalism”; Qian Forrest Zhang, “The Political Economy
of Contract Farming in China’s Agrarian Transition,” Journal of Agrarian Change 12, no. 4 (2012): 460–83.
38. See also Matthew A. Hale, “Reconstructing the Rural: Peasant Organizations in a Chinese Movement
for Alternative Development” (PhD thesis, University of Washington, 2013).
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ily from supporting agricultural production, since the margins for the task of
bulk buying of inputs and selling of produce is often low or even trivial. On
the other hand, the provision of microcredit and other ﬁnancial services can help
farmers shift to more valuable crops or activities. Given that most of China’s for-
mally organized credit organizations all but ignore individual farmers, this is no
small matter. Moreover, these rural credit cooperatives—unlike cooperatives that
are ostensibly designed to promote agricultural production—show that cooper-
ation in some forms is possible in rural China. Additional research is needed to
better understand the conditions under which rural credit cooperatives can pro-
vide needed services to farmers.
For advocates who envision cooperatives as representing some sort of third
way for the development of China’s rural society and agricultural production,
the results are profoundly disappointing. The leader of Northpoint hypothesized
that cooperatives are well positioned to mobilize social activities and provide so-
cial services but lack the ability and resources to successfully organize collective
purchasing of inputs and sales of produce among small landholders. Our ﬁnd-
ings are consistent with this conclusion.
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